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Abstract 
This research-perspective article reviews and contributes to the literature that explains how to deter 
internal computer abuse (ICA), which is criminal computer behavior committed by organizational 
insiders. ICA accounts for a large portion of insider trading, fraud, embezzlement, the selling of 
trade secrets, customer privacy violations, and other criminal behaviors, all of which are highly 
damaging to organizations. Although ICA represents a momentous threat for organizations, and 
despite numerous calls to examine this behavior, the academic response has thus far been 
lukewarm. However, a few security researchers have examined ICA’s influence in an 
organizational context and addressed potential means of deterring it. However, the results of these 
studies have been mixed, leading to a debate on the applicability of deterrence theory (DT) to ICA. 
We argue that more compelling opportunities will arise in DT research if security researchers more 
deeply study its assumptions and more carefully recontextualize it. The purpose of this article is to 
advance a deterrence research agenda that is grounded in the pivotal criminological deterrence 
literature. Drawing on the distinction between absolute and restrictive deterrence and aligning them 
with rational choice theory (RCT), this paper shows how deterrence can be used to mitigate the 
participation in and frequency of ICA. We thus propose that future research on the deterrent effects 
of ICA should be anchored in a more general RCT, rather than in examinations of deterrence as an 
isolated construct. We then explain how adopting RCT with DT opens up new avenues of research. 
Consequently, we propose three areas for future research, which cover not only the implications for 
the study of ICA deterrence, but also the potential motivations for these types of offenses and the 
skills required to undertake them.  
Keywords: Computer Abuse, Internal Computer Abuse (ICA), Deterrence Theory (DT), Rational 
Choice Theory (RCT), Absolute Deterrence, Restrictive Deterrence, Security, Behavioral Security, 
Organizational Security, Information Security Policies (Isps), Compliance Violations, Criminal 
Behavior 
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1 Introduction 
Computer abuse (CA) is a pervasive phenomenon that 
is increasing globally in severity and importance. 
Broadly, CA can be said to involve a wide variety of 
criminally and noncriminally abusive behaviors 
inside and outside of formal organizations; however, 
this manuscript focuses on internal CA (ICA), which 
is criminal computer behavior committed by 
organizational insiders. The formal positions 
occupied by organizational insiders give them unique 
access to organizational information that is not 
afforded to outsiders. These insiders include current 
and former employees, consultants, managers and 
executives, members of boards of directors, and often 
industry partners and suppliers (Posey, Roberts, 
Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013, p. 168). ICA 
accounts for a large portion of insider trading, fraud, 
embezzlement, the selling of trade secrets, customer 
privacy violations, and other criminal behaviors, all 
of which are highly damaging to organizations.  
Organizations are generally aware of and increasingly 
concerned about the magnitude of the threat posed by 
insiders.1 Nonetheless, the academic response to the 
threat posed by ICA has been anemic, despite calls in 
a number of papers to focus on this research area.2 
For example, Mahmood et al. (2010) drew on the 
symbolic distinction found in “Wild West” movies 
between the black hat and the white hat: the “bad 
guys” wear the former, and the “good guys” wear the 
latter. Applying this distinction to information 
systems security (ISec) research, they noted an 
overemphasis on white-hat studies, especially in the 
area of employee compliance with organizational 
information security policies, and a corresponding 
scarcity of black-hat studies that focus on the 
behavior of those intent on engaging in some form of 
ICA. Mahmood et al. (2010) asserted the need to resist 
the temptation offered by white-hat research and to 
                                                     
1 For example, in 2014, Ernst & Young published its Global 
Information Security Survey, which consisted of 1,825 
respondents from 60 countries (Ernst & Young, 2014). 
When asked about their most likely source of attack, the 
most common source was said to be employees (57%). The 
second most likely source consisted of contractors working 
on site (35%). Similarly, the 2015 PwC Global State of 
Information Security Survey reported that based on 9,700 
respondents from 154 countries, current employees were 
the most cited cause of cybercrime (PwC, 2015). Notably, 
the second most cited cause was former employees (30%). 
2 There are several examples of such research calls (e.g., 
Crossler, Johnston, Lowry, Hu, Warkentin, & Baskerville, 
2013; Lowry, Dinev, & Willison, 2017; Lowry, Posey, 
Bennett, & Roberts, 2015; Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, 
& Raghu, 2010; Posey et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 
2013). 
engage instead in harder-to-conduct black-hat studies. 
They argued that this shift could “elicit a virtuous cycle 
of research initiatives set in motion” (p. 432) and 
enable the development of improved safeguards based 
on the insights garnered from black-hat studies.  
Despite the relative paucity of ICA research, one 
research area that has captured the attention of ISec 
researchers is deterrence. From a temporal 
perspective, the aim of deterring an individual from 
ICA precedes prevention efforts, which are designed 
to stop the actual commission process (Straub & 
Welke, 1998; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). That is, 
deterrence consists of using the threat of sanctions to 
inhibit conduct. The literature has generally assumed 
that the deterrence mechanism is perceptual, and the 
sanctions researchers have identified are both formal 
(e.g., censure by an organization) and informal (e.g., 
censure by a social group). ISec researchers have 
primarily applied deterrence theory (DT), originally 
developed in the field of criminology, to explain the 
dissuasion of insecure behaviors. The underlying 
assumption of perceptual DT is that would-be 
wrongdoers are sufficiently rational to be influenced 
by their knowledge of the consequences of criminal 
actions. Thus, DT asserts that if an individual 
perceives the chances of being caught committing a 
crime as high (i.e., sanction certainty), the 
associated penalties as severe (i.e., sanction 
severity), and the penalties as meted out quickly 
(i.e., sanction celerity), then the individual will be 
deterred from carrying out a criminal act (Nagin, 
1998; Paternoster, 2010). As such, DT is fully 
compatible with a rational choice model of behavior. 
Deterrence efforts therefore provide an additional 
layer of IS security. Consequently, several studies 
have examined this phenomenon in an attempt to 
enhance its effectiveness in the organizational 
context. Unfortunately, the results of DT-based ISec 
studies have been mixed, leading to speculation 
regarding the merits of the theory (D’Arcy & Herath, 
2011). We believe that one reason for these 
inconsistent results is that researchers often apply DT 
in white-hat studies of employee compliance with 
organizational information security policies or in 
white-hat studies of noncriminal noncompliance with 
such policies, but without the necessary step of strong 
theoretical recontextualization, which we explain 
below (see Appendix A).3  
                                                     
3  There are several examples of white-hat studies of 
employee compliance with organizational information 
security policies (e.g., Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2013; 
Herath & Rao, 2009a; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010; Pahnila, 
Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007a; 2007b; Siponen, Pahnila, & 
Mahmood, 2007; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010; 
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 Thus, these new contexts could actually generate 
creative, useful ideas. But the fundamental 
contextualization issue is that DT was designed not to 
motivate good behavior or to explain how to thwart 
noncriminal noncompliance, but to explain and 
predict how to thwart criminal or antisocial behavior. 
In the IS field, therefore, DT should translate into a 
focus on various forms of black-hat criminal 
behavior, including ICA. To use DT in such a 
radically different context, the theory needs to be 
carefully recontextualized and its new application 
justified. Simply applying a theory in a new context is 
not recontextualization (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, 
Moody, & Polak, 2015; Whetten, Felin, & King, 
2009). Moreover, few IS studies have applied DT to 
ICA, and most of them are relatively old (e.g., 
Harrington, 1996; Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling, 2011; Lee 
& Lee, 2002; Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004; Peace, Galletta, 
& Thong, 2003; Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998; 
Willison, Warkentin, & Johnston, 2018).  
Overall, it appears that the criminal roots of DT that 
are pertinent to ICA are largely overlooked in current 
ISec literature. This omission suggests that DT has 
been erroneously contextualized in most ISec studies 
because few of them have focused on criminal 
behavior, and the omission could be the reason for the 
disparate findings in the ISec DT literature. 
Unfortunately, there are mixed findings even among 
the studies that have applied DT to ICA, and as we 
argue later, this may be due to the manner in which 
DT has been conceptualized and applied as a stand-
alone theory, despite its lack of resemblance to other 
social control theories (Paternoster, 1989b; Piliavin, 
Gartner, Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986). We posit that 
addressing DT in terms of both absolute and 
restrictive deterrence, and integrating these within the 
rational choice framework, represents a key omission 
in the ISec DT literature and therefore an important 
research opportunity that we address in this paper. 
The remainder of this research-perspective article is 
organized as follows. In the next section, we review 
the DT-related research. We then describe the 
absolute and restrictive deterrence concepts and their 
application within the rational choice framework. 
Based on this foundation, we advance a revised 
                                                                                
Son, 2011). Likewise, several white-hat studies have 
examined noncriminal noncompliance with organizational 
security policies (e.g., Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond, & 
Dennis, 2013; Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013; Guo & 
Yuan, 2012; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; 
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Ugrin, Pearson, & Odom, 2008; 
Ugrin & Pearson, 2013; Warkentin, McBride, Carter, & 
Johnston, 2012; Workman & Gathegi, 2007). See Appendix 
A. 
agenda for deterrence-based studies of ICA, which 
consists of three areas for future research. We 
conclude by outlining the contributions of this study.  
2 Literature Review: The 
Application of DT in ISEC 
Research 
To establish the foundation for this study, we 
carefully reviewed the DT-related research that deals 
with ICA and information security policy (ISP) 
violations, while excluding non-DT-based studies. 
Unlike the review by D’Arcy and Herath (2011), ours 
involved only studies that addressed workplace 
computing and some aspect of DT; moreover, we 
reviewed working papers, books, and conferences in 
addition to journal articles. DT articles that focused 
on consumer-based computer crimes, such as digital 
piracy outside of the workplace by consumers or 
students (Gopal & Sanders, 1997; Higgins, Wilson, & 
Fell, 2005; Zhang, Smith, & McDowell, 2009), 
nonsecure behavior by consumers (James, 
Nottingham, & Kim, 2013), and hacking by outsiders 
(Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 2007), were not 
reviewed. Moreover, DT-based studies on computer 
crimes committed by students (e.g., Dugo, 2007; 
Hollinger, 1993) were not included, and work for 
which the data were unavailable was not processed 
(Warkentin, Malimage, et al., 2012). Studies that 
were related to DT but did not directly use it or its 
related surrogate measures were also excluded (e.g., 
Choi, Levy, & Hovav, 2013). Finally, one study was 
omitted because all the deterrence effects it examined 
were at the organizational level (Schuessler, 2009). 
Appendix A provides a detailed summary of the 
articles that fell within the scope of our review. 
In the literature review, several notable patterns 
emerged. First, virtually all studies used either cross-
sectional surveys or factorial surveys based on 
hypothetical scenarios. The one exception, a study by 
Workman and Gathegi (2007), was a field experiment 
involving a control and two treatments as well as a 
follow-up measurement after six months to determine 
whether punishment and ethics interventions could 
decrease security policy contravention.  
Second, most of the studies did not involve actual 
ICA behaviors that were malicious and criminal. 
Most involved ISP noncompliance/compliance 
intentions via self-report or through hypothetical 
scenarios. Other studies included malicious and 
nonmalicious compliance behaviors (e.g., D’Arcy & 
Hovav, 2009; Lowry et al., 2015). Only a few DT-
based security studies actually provided empirical 
evidence of malicious, criminal ICA in the workplace 
(Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2004; 
Lowry, Posey, Roberts, & Bennett, 2014; Peace et al., 
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2003; Posey, Bennett, Roberts, & Lowry, 2011; 
Straub, 1990; Willison et al., 2018).  
Third, as also noted by D’Arcy and Herath (2011), we 
found that the studies’ operationalization of DT-
sanctions constructs exhibited several pivotal 
disparities. Some adhered to DT by considering both 
the severity and certainty of sanctions (e.g., Cheng et 
al., 2013; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 
2009b); however, only three studies also considered 
celerity—an integral part of DT—as a separate 
construct (Chuma, 2012; Hu et al., 2011; Lowry et al., 
2015). Other studies, though they recognized severity 
and certainty (and sometimes celerity), combined all 
of these into one operationalized sanctions/deterrence 
construct rather than analyzing them individually 
(Barlow et al., 2013; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010; D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Guo & 
Yuan, 2012; Guo et al., 2011; Siponen et al., 2007; 
Siponen et al., 2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Another large group of studies did not measure the 
DT constructs but instead used other constructs; such 
as security, education, training, and awareness 
(SETA) programs, security awareness, and ISPs, as 
general surrogates for sanctions (D’Arcy & Hovav, 
2007; 2009; Fan & Zhang, 2011; Harrington, 1996; 
Lee et al., 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998; Ugrin et al., 
2008; Ugrin & Pearson, 2013; Workman & Gathegi, 
2007). Finally, one study showed no relationship 
between sanctions and intentions but did show 
relationships with formal risks, which in turn 
influence sanctions (Hu et al., 2011). 
Fourth, most of the studies explored constructs that 
could plausibly be considered extensions of DT, such 
as informal sanctions, as well as several constructs 
that are unrelated to DT. Various forms of 
morality/moral and commitment/shame sanctions 
were used, which were sometimes justified as 
informal sanctions (e.g., Siponen & Vance, 2010). In 
other studies, informal sanctions were added from 
various morality theories (e.g., Hu et al., 2011). Other 
forms of informal sanctions included various types of 
social norms and pressures (Cheng et al., 2013). 
Because some studies examined compliance instead 
of noncompliance, several studies added the concept 
of rewards for good behavior (Chen et al., 2013; 
Pahnila et al., 2007a; Siponen et al., 2010). 
Finally, although the purpose of DT is to explain how 
to deter criminal/malicious behaviors, several studies 
adopted the opposite approach and used DT to predict 
good behaviors. Most of these studies predicted ISP 
compliance intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen et 
al., 2013; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Pahnila et al., 2007a; 2007b; Siponen et al., 
2007; Siponen et al., 2010; Son, 2011). One study 
predicted IT security effectiveness (Kankanhalli, Teo, 
Tan, & Wei, 2003), another predicted Internet use 
policy compliance intentions (Li et al., 2010), and one 
predicted the intention to avoid Internet misuse (Liao, 
Luo, Gurung, & Li, 2009).  
Unfortunately, even within the few studies that applied 
DT to ICA, there were mixed findings across their varied 
contexts, and these studies are quite dated (Harrington, 
1996; Hu et al., 2011; Lee & Lee, 2002; Lee et al., 2004; 
Peace et al., 2003; Straub, 1990; Straub, 1986).  
In light of these issues, we conclude that the 
conversation on DT’s applicability and 
recontextualization to ISec should be in its beginning, 
rather than its end, stages. Although we certainly 
cannot rule out the possibility that the inconsistent 
outcomes in this literature are artifacts of the varied 
methods and contexts, we believe much more has yet 
to be learned about applying and recontextualizing 
DT in security contexts. These kinds of adaptations 
are not necessarily wrong or misguided; indeed, they 
could represent compelling new directions for DT 
research. However, such dramatic departures from 
DT would benefit from stronger recontextualizations 
of the theory and justifications of the theoretical 
changes. Consequently, DT could be built on more 
effectively—for example, by following the advice of 
Whetten et al. (2009) and Boss et al. (2015) on this 
contextualization process. 4  When theories are 
recontextualized, a thoughtful recognition of their 
assumptions and boundary conditions can bring to 
light many unexpected opportunities that enrich both 
the theory and our empirical work. We expand on this 
argument in the next section, where we introduce 
absolute and restrictive deterrence. 
3 Defining Absolute and Restrictive 
Deterrence 
As noted, a major drawback of ISec researchers’ use 
of DT is the inconsistency of the research findings. 
Again, these could simply be artifacts of empirical 
research. However, we posit that several of the issues 
also begin at the conceptual level, which is the focus 
of the remainder of this paper. In a review of the ISec 
DT literature, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) discussed the 
failings of this body of research and proposed a series 
of recommendations for future studies. For instance, 
they argued that DT studies should do the following: 
                                                     
4 An especially detailed and painstaking example of how 
such a theoretical recontextualization should occur in a 
security/privacy context was recently demonstrated in Wall, 
Lowry, & Barlow (2016). To date, this simply has not been 
done in recontextualizing DT to noncriminal ISP policy 
compliance, and it thus represents a strong theoretical 
opportunity that could dramatically improve the associated 
empirical research. 
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Incorporate the more comprehensive 
rational choice framework that accounts 
for both positive and negative 
consequences of behavior, especially since 
research indicates that perceived benefits 
have a strong influence on corporate 
offending decisions (Simpson et al. 2002). 
Assessing the impact of sanctions along 
with the competing influences of positive 
incentives provides a more complete 
understanding of the deterrence process 
(pp. 655–656). 
The authors noted that with the exception of one 
paper, the research articles focused solely on the 
traditional costs of formal sanctions. Notably, similar 
observations, dating back to the 1980s, had already 
been made in the field of criminology. Piliavin et al. 
(1986) argued that DT researchers had been 
preoccupied with the isolated effects of the severity 
and certainty of sanctions on illegal behaviors. They 
further asserted that it would prove more beneficial if 
DT were studied within an explicit theoretical 
framework, and to this end, they incorporated formal 
sanctions within a rational choice model. Aside from 
the consideration of these sanctions, the application of 
this type of model also allowed Piliavin et al. (1986) 
to examine the role of benefits/rewards in the criminal 
decision-making process. Thus, their model viewed 
the offender as calculating not only the expected 
utility/disutility of illegal actions but also the legal 
alternatives. They concluded that if the expected 
utility of illegal actions is perceived as greater than 
that of the legal alternatives, illegal actions will be 
more likely to occur.  
Similarly, Paternoster (1989a; 1989b; 2010) observed 
that criminological DT research remained isolated 
from general theories of control and lamented the lack 
of theoretical and conceptual development since the 
seminal work of Gibbs (1975) was published. 
Acknowledging the advances made by Piliavin et al. 
(1986), Paternoster (1989a) aimed to extend this work 
by considering how DT could be more fully integrated 
into a rational choice framework. Paternoster argued 
that DT criminologists had failed to clearly delineate 
which criminal decisions would be influenced by 
formal sanctions. Thus, he stated that 
neither classic nor more contemporary 
deterrence theorists have carefully 
specified the specific offending decisions 
that are to be affected by subjective 
assessment of the certainty and severity of 
punishment. As a result, deterrence 
researchers have not recognized that 
persons make several kinds of offending 
decisions that may be differentially 
affected by a given set of explanatory 
factors (Paternoster, 1989b, p. 9). 
To illustrate this point, Paternoster (1989a; 1989b) 
cited the work of several bodies of criminological 
research in which, despite their differing foci, it was 
acknowledged that offenders make several choices in 
the criminal decision-making process (e.g., 
Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986; Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985). As an illustration, Paternoster 
(1989a) noted the work of Blumstein et al. (1986) and 
their research on criminal careers (see also Blumstein, 
Cohen, & Farrington, 1988). In this context, the word 
career is used solely to describe the sequence of 
offenses during a period in the offender’s life; it does 
not necessarily indicate that any earnings gathered 
through crime will form the basis of the offender’s 
livelihood. Thus, researchers in this field emphasized 
that for an offender, there is a beginning (i.e., 
participation), continuation (i.e., career length), and 
cessation (i.e., end of criminal career). Related to 
these decisions is the criminal’s frequency of 
offending, which refers to the number of offenses 
committed by an active offender.  
Given these stages in the offender’s decision-making 
process, Paternoster (1989a) crucially noted that a 
deterrence effect could take two forms and advanced 
a comprehensive rational choice model of delinquent 
offending. This model considers deterrence in the 
traditional manner, noting that an offender could be 
deterred from committing further criminal acts, which 
impacts the frequency of offending; however, the 
model also affords a specific consideration that an 
individual may be deterred from ever participating in 
a crime, or to use the terminology from Blumstein et 
al. (1986), whether or not there is a “beginning” to a 
criminal career. To substantiate his position, 
Paternoster (1989a) drew on the work of Gibbs 
(1975), who distinguished between absolute and 
restrictive deterrence. Gibbs (1975) described 
absolute deterrence as occurring when “an individual 
has refrained throughout life from a particular type of 
criminal act because in whole or in part he or she has 
perceived some risk of someone suffering a 
punishment as a response to the crime” (p. 32).  
Consequently, in the ISec context, researchers would 
use the term absolute deterrence to describe the 
deterrence of organizational insiders from ever 
committing ICA. For example, if the fear of being 
detected has inhibited an insider from even 
attempting to use his or her office computer to 
commit some type of cybercrime, the person has been 
absolutely deterred. Restrictive deterrence, in 
contrast, has been defined as  
the curtailment of a certain type of criminal 
activity by an individual during some period 
because in whole or in part the curtailment is 
perceived by the individual as reducing the 
risk that someone will be punished as a 
response to the activity (Gibbs, 1975, p. 33).  
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Thus, in the ISec context, restrictive deterrence would 
apply only to insiders who have committed a form of 
ICA at least once and who will have to decide 
whether or not to engage in another crime. 
Clarke and Cornish (1985) advanced their rational 
choice theory (RCT) perspective four years earlier 
than Paternoster’s (1989a) position on absolute and 
restrictive deterrence. They argued that criminals 
make what are termed involvement and event 
decisions. Regarding the involvement decisions, they 
noted like Paternoster that an offender makes a series 
of choices related to the three stages of a criminal 
career (Blumstein et al., 1986), that is, in terms of 
“beginning” criminal activity (i.e., initial involvement; 
described by Paternoster as participation), whether to 
continue (continuation), and when to stop (cessation). 
Event decisions are choices made during the 
perpetration of a crime. Clarke and Cornish’s work on 
RCT has evolved into a seminal criminological model 
(cf. Cornish & Clarke, 2014). 
To highlight the differences between the decision 
stages, Clarke and Cornish (1985) depicted the stages 
in a series of models, using burglary in a middle-class 
suburb as an example. These models served as 
schematic representations, illustrating the key 
decision points in criminal behaviors. Accordingly, of 
specific relevance to the application of absolute 
deterrence is their initial involvement model, which is 
similar to Paternoster’s (1989a) discussion of 
participation, as noted. More specifically, Clarke and 
Cornish’s initial involvement model allowed for the 
consideration of the benefits and costs associated with 
the legitimate/illegitimate alternatives as well as the 
potential costs incurred through the likelihood and 
severity of punishment—the two constructs central to 
DT. Thus, as in Paternoster’s research, Clarke and 
Cornish recognized the possible influence of (absolute) 
deterrence at the initial involvement/participation stage.  
4 A Revised Deterrence Research 
Agenda for Security Research 
As our literature review shows, although ICA 
represents a major threat for organizations, and 
despite numerous calls to examine this form of 
behavior, the academic response has been 
underwhelming. Of course, this means the 
conversation on DT’s application to ICA has many 
remaining opportunities. Although some studies have 
used DT to improve the understanding of ICA, the 
manner in which some studies have done so can be 
characterized as not fully realizing the possibilities 
and assumptions of DT—and this has led to mixed 
outcomes. For instance, the literature review suggests 
that ISec research should refocus on black-hat 
behavior rather than just examining nonmalicious 
behavior; furthermore, ISec researchers would benefit 
from basing their work on actual security behaviors 
instead of hypothetical behaviors. However, these 
well-known and straightforward points are not the 
focus of this article. Instead, the major contribution of 
this study is to challenge and extend, on the basis of 
criminological research, the actual conceptualization 
of deterrence itself. After examining the key 
criminological studies of Paternoster (1989a) and 
Clarke and Cornish (1985), we argue that ISec 
research should undertake a fundamental shift: it 
should rethink the conceptualization of deterrence 
itself in order to account for rational forces and 
absolute and restrictive deterrence.  
Before we discuss three related areas for future 
research, we argue that DT should be extended using 
an RCT perspective. Paternoster (1989a) and Piliavin 
et al. (1986) were keen to address a limitation of 
previous criminological deterrence studies, which had 
been preoccupied with studying the isolated effects of 
the severity and certainty of sanctions on potential 
illegal behaviors. They argued that on their own, 
these formal sanctions bore little resemblance to more 
general theories of social control. To address this 
limitation, Paternoster (1989a) incorporated formal 
sanctions within an RCT model of offending, which 
offered a “fully specific model of social control” (p. 
289). Table 1 lists the key explanatory factors 
included in Paternoster’s DT/RCT choice model of 
participation and frequency of involvement in four 
minor delinquent offenses.5 
Deterrence researchers from the field of criminology 
are not the only researchers who have been 
“preoccupied” with formal sanctions. This is also the 
case for ISec researchers. As D’Arcy and Herath 
(2011) noted in their review of the deterrence 
literature, with the exception of one paper, the 
assessed research articles focused solely on the 
traditional costs of formal sanctions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Although Paternoster (1989a) proposed the application of 
RCT, he did not examine the potential benefits that could be 
accrued through either legitimate or illegitimate actions. 
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Table 1. Key Explanatory Factors of Paternoster’s (1989a) DT/RCT Model 
Explanatory factor categories Example factors 
Demographic background factors • Gender 
• Family structure 
• Assistance 
Delinquent opportunities • Parental supervision 
• Social activities with peers 
• Peer involvement in delinquency 
Nondelinquent lines of action • Desired education 
• Expected education 
• Expected occupation  
• Grades 
• Commitment to school 
• Religious activities 
• General conventional commitments 
Valued social relationships • Attachment to father 
• Attachment to mother 
• Attachment to teachers 
• Attachment to best friends 
Informal sanctions for delinquency • General informal sanctions 
• Peer sanctions for specific delinquent act 
• Parental sanctions for specific delinquent act 
Formal legal sanctions • Perceived certainty of punishment 
• Perceived severity of punishment 
• Caught by the police for prior delinquency 
Moral commitments • Moral beliefs against specific delinquent acts 
Note: Table adapted from Paternoster (1989a, p. 294). 
One reason for the mixed findings in ISec deterrence 
research may simply be that on their own, formal 
sanctions do not reflect any theory of social control. 
We believe the RCT framework provides a more 
comprehensive and accurate reflection of the factors 
an individual will consider as part of the decision to 
become involved in crime at the “initial involvement” 
stage. 6  These factors include deterrence sanctions. 
Thus, the offender is viewed as calculating not only 
the utility/disutility of illegal actions, but also that of 
legal actions. It can therefore be predicted that if the 
expected utility of illegal actions exceeds that of the 
legal alternatives, an individual will be more likely to 
decide to engage in a specific crime at a later date 
(i.e., they will have reached a state of “readiness”). 
Moreover, we propose the use of the RCT framework 
for the future development of ICA research, because 
it has proven its value in studies of general criminal 
                                                     
6 Importantly, this is a key departure from Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010), who partially used RCT to predict compliance 
intentions, and Hu et al. (2011), who mixed DT, RCT, and a 
couple of other theories in predicting noncompliance 
intentions. Both overlook initial involvement and actual 
behaviors. 
conduct (Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006; 
Piliavin et al., 1986). 
Without a recognition of the range of factors 
incorporated within RCT and their relationship with 
DT constructs, we could find ourselves stuck with 
overly simplistic models that do not reflect reality. 
Implementing these factors would answer the call for 
more comprehensive accounts of how deterrence can 
occur and would avoid an oversimplified 
understanding of offender behaviors based on the 
certainty and severity of punishment (Piliavin et al., 
1986). This is particularly compelling, because 
substantial expertise on both perspectives exists in 
our research community; we just have to combine 
these forms of expertise to realize their potential. 
We now move on to a discussion of three areas for 
future ISec DT research. 
4.1 Research Area 1: Absolute Versus 
Restrictive Deterrence 
Advancing the application of an RCT model enables 
the consideration of the relationship between 
deterrence and the different stages in the criminal 
decision-making process. It is important for security 
researchers to recognize that offenders engage in a 
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1194 
 
number of choices during the criminal decision-
making process (Blumstein et al., 1988; Blumstein et 
al., 1986; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Hagan, 1997; 
Piquero & Benson, 2004; Sampson & Laub, 1995). 
Indeed, this view is now so firmly entrenched within 
the criminological discipline that a subdiscipline 
called developmental criminology has emerged 
(Farrinton, 2003; Piquero, 2008; Sampson & Laub, 
2005). This strand of research has also confirmed that 
in addition to making decisions regarding the crime 
event (which impact the frequency of crime), 
offenders make choices regarding their participation 
in, continuation of, and desistance from crime.  
On the basis of these insights, we assert that RCT is a 
highly promising framework for conceptualizing and 
studying absolute deterrence. Indeed, when 
considering sanctions as potentially influencing 
factors, the articulation of these decisions allows for 
the application of deterrence for two different aims. 
As noted, one aim is that sanctions effectively deter 
individuals from ever participating in crime (i.e., 
absolute deterrence). The second aim is to reduce the 
frequency of offending (i.e., restrictive deterrence).  
Drawing on RCT and applying the absolute 
deterrence concept can thus provide a far better 
understanding of where the influence of deterrence 
occurs in the criminal decision-making process. More 
specifically, (absolute) deterrence can initially exert 
an influence in the participation stage as opposed to 
the event stage. In terms of existing ISec DT studies, 
deterrence will first exert an influence not in the 
formation of intention but rather prior to it. This 
understanding is enhanced when absolute deterrence 
at the participation stage is considered, as illustrated 
by the work of Clarke and Cornish (1985), which is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
Unlike Paternoster (1989a), who conducted his 
research through surveys, Clarke and Cornish (1985) 
drew on offenders’ accounts of burglary in the 
development of their decision-making models. As 
highlighted, of specific relevance to the current 
discussion is their initial involvement model (see 
Figure 1), which reflects the stage Paternoster 
referred to as participation. In essence, the model is a 
graphical depiction of RCT. Thus, the Clarke and 
Cornish model offers significant clarity regarding the 
factors of influence in this stage of the criminal 
decision-making process, and we therefore advocate 
its use in conceptualizing absolute deterrence at the 
initial involvement/participation stage.  
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Figure 1. Clarke and Cornish (1985) Initial Involvement Model 
There are two key decision points in this model. The 
first is when an individual has reached a state of 
readiness (Box 7). As Clarke and Cornish (1985, p. 
167) noted, 
Readiness involves rather more than 
receptiveness: it implies that the individual 
has actually contemplated this form of 
crime as a solution to his needs and has 
decided that under the right circumstances 
he would commit the offence.  
Thus, in reaching a state of readiness, individuals will 
not be considering the perpetration of a specific 
offense but whether an offense will act as a solution 
to their needs (Box 3). This state will have been 
informed by a consideration of possible solutions 
(Box 4) to these needs and whether they can best be 
met through legitimate or illegitimate means (Box 5). 
Accordingly, not only does such a model allow for 
the consideration of the benefits and costs associated 
with the legitimate/illegitimate alternatives, but it also 
includes the potential costs that could be incurred 
through “the likelihood and severity of punishment” 
(Box 4), that is, the two central constructs of DT. The 
appraisals made in Box 4 will also be influenced by 
an individual’s self-perception, moral code, and 
previous experience with crime and the extent to 
which planning/employing foresight is possible (Box 
2). In addition, Boxes 2 and 3 will be influenced by what 
Clarke and Cornish (1985) termed background factors 
(Box 1). These factors are examined using criminological 
theories that explain how individuals develop criminal 
dispositions. Typically, these theories examine 
psychological, familial, and sociodemographic factors. 
The second key decision in the initial involvement 
model is Box 8, which refers to the decision to 
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commit a burglary. It is important to note that Clarke 
and Cornish (1985) modeled this decision separately 
and referred to it as their event model. Therefore, 
(absolute) deterrence initially exerts an influence at 
the participation stage, when an individual is 
evaluating potential solutions (Box 4) and how this 
further influences potential “perceived solutions” 
(Box 5). If the perceived solution is deemed to be 
criminal in nature, then the individual has reached the 
state of readiness, and at a later point in time, the 
criminal event may or may not occur.  
Given the above discussion, we now advance our first 
question for future research:  
Future Research Question 1: Which factors exert 
an absolute deterrence influence at the initial 
involvement stage of the criminal decision-
making process? 
As noted, in the RCT framework, formal deterrence 
sanctions form only part of the influences at the initial 
involvement stage. This then raises the question of 
what other types of deterrence factors will be 
influential at the initial involvement stage, 
particularly in view of the focus on ICA and the 
people who could possibly perpetrate this form of 
crime. Although Clarke and Cornish (1985) cited only 
formal sanctions, there is no reason the range of 
sanctions based on Paternoster’s (1989a) study could 
not be considered for the initial involvement model. 
Table 2 therefore represents our attempt to revise the 
factors from Paternoster’s study for the organizational 
context with regard to ICA. This is in keeping with 
the work of Clarke and Cornish, who acknowledged 
that the configuration of the models will differ 
according to the type of crime under consideration. 
However, we urge careful contextualization as ISec 
researchers consider these factors.7 Given our focus 
on ICA, examining the concept of shame may prove 
fruitful. Several criminological rational choice studies 
have used this self-imposed sanction to understand its 
influence on the deterrence process (Grasmick, 
Bursik, & Kinsey, 1991; Grasmick & Green, 1980; 
Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996; Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996). The need to develop 
an understanding of these informal sanctions would 
thus be of paramount importance, because these 
studies have emphasized that employees are 
particularly vulnerable to this form of cost given their 
stake in conventional society (Willison & Warkentin, 
2013). In addition, mainstream criminological DT 
research has noted that there is now greater 
confidence that nonlegal factors, as opposed to formal 
sanctions, can ensure deterrence (Paternoster, 2010). 
We conclude this section by noting that this research 
area, and the other two we are about to propose, 
provide excellent opportunities for ISec researchers to 
move from the limited idea of the IT artifact to the 
more general idea of the IS artifact, as proposed by 
Lee, Thomas, & Baskerville (2015). We share the 
view of Lee et al. and of Currie (2009), who 
maintained that there needs to be a better distinction 
between the IT artifact and its context, which could 
include the organizational, social, and environmental 
factors of a system’s implementation.
                                                     
7 A key process in theory building from one discipline to a 
new discipline is to carefully rethink and recontextualize 
factors from a source context to a new context and to 
carefully challenge and examine the underlying theoretical 
assumptions, because not everything may hold in the new 
context or in the same way (Boss et al., 2015; Whetten et 
al., 2009). Thus, great care should be taken to 
recontextualize the factors from criminology into 
appropriate ISec factors. 
 
Table 2. DT/RCT Model Factors Adapted to Thwarting ICA in an Organizational Context 
Explanatory factor categories Example factors 
Demographic background factors • Gender 
• Family responsibilities 
• Job type 
• Education level 
• Salary 
ICA opportunities • Direct supervision from management 
• Social activities with coworkers 
• Coworker involvement in ICA 
• Access to confidential data and open-access systems 
• System monitoring and logging 
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Table 2. DT/RCT Model Factors Adapted to Thwarting ICA in an Organizational Context 
Noncriminal lines of action • Desired promotion 
• Professional viewpoint toward occupation  
• Annual performance review 
• Commitment to organization 
• Religious activities 
• General conventional commitments 
Valued social relationships • Attachment to family 
• Attachment to coworkers 
• Attachment to supervisor 
• Attachment to best friends 
Informal sanctions for delinquency • General informal sanctions 
• Peer sanctions for specific ICA act 
• Supervisor sanctions for specific ICA act 
Formal legal and organizational sanctions • Perceived certainty of punishment 
• Perceived severity of punishment 
• Caught by the police for prior ICA 
• Caught by organization for prior ICA 
• Knowledge of law 
• Knowledge of applicable organizational policies 
Moral commitments • Moral beliefs against specific ICA acts 
• Organizational membership or licensing requirements against ICA (e.g., 
certified CPA) 
• Tendency to employ neutralization 
Note: Table adapted from Paternoster (1989a, p. 294) to the ICA context. 
From an organizational security perspective, this 
strongly resonates with us. Thus, we encourage ISec 
researchers to identify the “security artifacts” that 
matter and to address the proposed research questions 
accordingly. Ideas for related future research could 
easily fill another paper, so we will present only a 
couple of in-depth examples: for initial deterrence, it 
is important to consider factors other than formal and 
informal sanctions, and instead to think about which 
kind of IS artifacts could deliver or influence such 
sanctions, such as system design for enhancing social 
visibility or monitoring, system alerts, organizational 
interventions such as co-located working and job 
sharing, training interventions, and so on. 
4.2 Research Area 2: Motivations for 
ICA at Initial Involvement 
The next area we propose for future deterrence 
research relates to a consideration of the motivations 
for ICA. When Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) initial 
involvement model was discussed, it was noted that it 
is useful for highlighting when deterrence influences 
occur in the criminal decision-making process; 
however, the model also assists in clarifying the 
relationship between the factors of influence at the 
participation stage, including factors that may 
motivate individuals to consider participating in ICA. 
Given the focus on intention in the ISec deterrence 
literature, the issue of participation has been 
overlooked along with the motivational factors that 
occur at this stage. For example, despite citing 
Cornish and Clarke (1986), who discussed the initial 
involvement model, Hu et al. (2011, p. 58) argued, 
We submit that when an individual is 
presented with an opportunity to commit 
policy violations, his or her behavior 
depends on the rational calculus of the 
costs and the benefits.  
Therefore, to advance a clearer understanding of these 
motives, the initial involvement model is again 
advocated. As highlighted, Clarke and Cornish (1985) 
acknowledged that numerous criminological theories 
have been proposed for explaining how individuals 
come to develop criminal dispositions, which cause 
individuals to be more inclined to acts of a criminal 
nature. These theories (Agnew, 1992; Cloward & 
Ohlin, 2013; Hirschi, 2002) have noted the role of 
influences, which may include specific social factors 
(e.g., poor housing, low-quality education), 
psychological influences (e.g., mental illness), or the 
inheritance of traits (e.g., low self-control). Clarke 
and Cornish recognized the role of these influences in 
their initial involvement model and described them as 
background factors (see Box 1). In addition, they 
argued that the influence of such factors on an 
individual’s decision to participate in crime would be 
moderated by “situational” and “transitory” forces. 
Indeed, advancing the example of computer fraud as a 
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case in point, they further asserted that for certain 
types of crime, background factors, and therefore the 
extent to which dispositional theories can help to 
explain participation, may be of far less relevance 
than an individual’s immediate situation.  
For ISec research, the influence of these situational 
and transitory forces is evident in a series of ongoing 
studies conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and the 
CERT Division based at Carnegie Mellon University. 
Their research has determined that a problem in an 
employee’s personal life can influence his or her 
actions in the workplace. Thus, a report by Cappelli, 
Keeney, Kowalski, Moore, & Randazzo (2004) 
focused on the U.S. banking and finance sector. In the 
23 cases of ICA examined, 27% of the perpetrators 
were experiencing financial difficulties in their 
private lives. These findings were echoed in a later 
CERT publication (Cappelli, Moore, & Trzeciak, 
2012), which noted the interplay between the spheres 
of personal and work lives. When discussing 
incidents of computer fraud, they noted (p. 115), 
The lives of insiders who committed fraud 
in our cases were often in turmoil . . . 
insiders often have severe financial 
problems. In addition, insiders had other 
personal issues such as a family member 
with health problems, substance abuse and 
physical threats by outsiders.  
Cappelli et al. (2012) subsequently noted the role of 
what they termed “stressors” in motivating computer 
fraud. More specifically, they categorized these 
stressors as internal and therefore as workplace 
occurrences (e.g., the threat of company layoffs, an 
employee not receiving an expected pay raise). 
Alternatively, stressors could be external to the workplace 
context—that is, occurring in employees’ private lives 
(e.g., expensive hospital bills, gambling addiction). 
Evidence for situational and transitory influences can 
also be found in the white-collar literature, which has 
examined this type of offense committed by 
individuals for their own gain, as opposed to 
employees who perpetrate white-collar crimes for the 
benefit of their companies (Weisburd, 1991; 
Weisburd & Waring, 2001; Wheeler, Weisburd, 
Waring, & Bode, 1988). As discussed, criminological 
dispositional theories and the various influences they 
advance in creating dispositions have been 
categorized by Clarke and Cornish (1985) as 
background factors (see Box 1). These theories, 
which have been developed to explain delinquency or 
street crimes, posit that for these groups of offenders, 
the participation in crime occurs early in life and 
during but not after adolescence (Blumstein et al., 
1986; Piquero & Benson, 2004); however, this is 
contrary to white-collar offenses in which 
participation occurs much later in life, as evidenced 
in studies by Benson and Kerley (2000) and Weisburd 
and Waring (2001). They found that white-collar 
offenders were around the age of 40 when they chose 
to participate in crimes. To explain this finding, 
Piquero and Benson (2004) noted the role of 
situational influences, and they emphasized the 
presence of a crisis in either an individual’s work or 
personal life as a critical factor. This mirrors previous 
white-collar research, which advocated focusing on 
contemporaneous problems experienced by 
individuals in either their work or personal lives to 
explain their participation in such offenses. As 
Benson and Kerley (2000, p. 133) noted, 
One searches in vain for early precursors 
or early hints of trouble in the life-history 
of the typical white-collar offender. For 
most of these individuals, their offences 
appear to come out of nowhere. Their 
crimes do not appear to be part of 
longstanding patterns of anti-social 
conduct, nor do they appear to be deeply 
rooted in a troubled social background. . . 
. White-collar crime appears to be more a 
function of adult life experiences as 
opposed to latent personality traits or 
disturbed social background.  
Given the above discussion, we now advance our 
second research question: 
Future Research Question 2: What are the 
situational and transitory factors that motivate 
ICA at the initial involvement stage? 
It is important to note that these factors are not IS-
specific. This is obviously the case for external 
factors, such as financial problems due to a divorce, 
medical bills, and various addictions; however, it is 
also the case for internal factors, such as when the 
threat of redundancy or the failure of being promoted 
may motivate individuals. These internal motivations 
are common to all employees.  
It should also be noted that it is only by recognizing 
the different decision-making stages and the decisions 
and behaviors at each stage that a clear overview of 
the criminal process is afforded. Thus, we have 
demonstrated in this section that the initial 
involvement model allows for consideration of the 
motivational factors; however, the model also allows 
for consideration of the relationships between these 
motivational factors and the issues of deterrence. 
Clarke and Cornish (1985) suggested that these 
situational and transitory forces moderate background 
factors (again, Figure 1, Box 1), which influence 
“previous experience and learning” (Box 2) and 
“generalized needs” (Box 3). It is therefore likely 
that these situational and transitory forces influence 
the offender’s “generalized needs.” Future research 
could consider the extent to which the influence of 
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deterrents in the “solutions evaluated” stage (Box 
4) is strong enough to lead to a perceived 
legitimate solution (Box 5).  
As noted, the ISec deterrence literature has generally 
assumed that the motivations of an offender can be 
understood in terms of the factors that influence 
intention. Without an appropriate understanding of 
the participation stage, ISec researchers may continue 
to relate all motivating influences to intentions and 
thereby conflate causal relationships. We believe this 
research area, in addition to that of the IS artifact, is 
ripe for the use of real-time big-data analytics to 
create predictive models of potential readiness based 
on previous incidents. Such management “alerts” 
could direct management to people who are likely in 
need of more support and oversight, so that their 
readiness does not turn into action. Although there 
would be ethical concerns with such research and 
practice, organizations have already made legal use of 
predictive analytics to predict factors, such as which 
employees are most likely to quit prematurely, and to 
use this information to help them (Hewlett-Packard 
has done so to great effect). Organizations would not 
be privy to all key life events that could trigger ICA, 
but they are legally privy to some that could be 
studied in a consistent, predictive manner (e.g., 
change in marital status, surviving a round of layoffs 
in a department, credit score changes, change in 
number of family dependents, poor work reviews). 
4.3 Research Area 3: Skills and Abilities 
of Offenders at Initial Involvement 
Our third area for future research pertains to the skills 
and abilities of insiders who plan ICA, how these skills 
and abilities relate to the organizational context in which 
they work, and how this relationship can influence 
decision-making at the initial involvement stage. 
As noted, Clarke and Cornish (1985) acknowledged 
that the configuration of the initial involvement 
model will differ according to the type of crime under 
consideration. Thus, as indicated in Box 2 of their 
initial involvement model, it is unlikely that insiders 
will have “direct and vicarious experience with 
crime” and “contact with law enforcement agencies”; 
however, employees certainly have the ideal location 
and the necessary time to undertake “foresight and 
planning,” given that they work in the very environment 
in which the crime would occur. This is unlike the vast 
majority of other crimes; thus, differences such as these 
need to be acknowledged and considered in terms of 
their influence at the initial involvement stage. 
The issue of how potential offenders plan for ICA has 
received little attention in the ISec field. The ISec 
studies in this area have focused mostly on the 
intention for this type of behavior, and the focus has 
therefore remained on the act of perpetration (i.e., 
D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; 
2009; D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Harrington, 
1996; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Hu et al., 2011; Lee et 
al., 2004; Lowry et al., 2015; Peace et al., 2003). 
Yet, it should be recognized that this focus is based 
on the assumption that any influences must relate to 
this construct. However, and as noted, the RCT 
framework provides a much clearer insight into 
offender decision-making and the associated 
influences at the initial involvement and event stages. 
Thus, at the initial involvement stage, consideration 
can be given to the planning process and its role in 
influencing an individual’s participation decision.  
Despite the paucity of research on the topic, some 
ISec studies have considered the offender-context 
dynamic and its implications for planning. To 
investigate what constitutes an opportunity for ICA, 
Willison (2006) drew on insights from environmental 
criminology (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991) to 
highlight the role of awareness spaces for potential 
offenders. For street offenders, these spaces may 
encompass the neighborhoods in which they live. 
Through their daily activities, such as traveling to 
work and going shopping, offenders become aware of 
potential opportunities, such as a car to steal or a 
convenience store to rob. What distances employees 
from street offenders is that they spend a large part of 
their days in the very context in which offenses are 
subsequently committed. Therefore, unlike street 
offenders, dishonest employees have the luxury of 
spending a considerable amount of time recognizing 
potential opportunities. Such recognition may remain 
purely innocent, but a change in personal 
circumstance may force a reconsideration of whether 
to act on them. 
The idea that potential offenders use information 
from their environment to search for and assess 
potential opportunities is also consistent with Clarke 
and Cornish (1985), who in their work on RCT argue 
that offenders are limited by “bounded rationality.” 
That is, criminal decision-making is at times less than 
perfect, as a consequence of the conditions under 
which decisions are made. As a result of the risks and 
uncertainty associated with offending, criminals may 
make decisions without the knowledge of all the 
potential costs and benefits (i.e., the risks, efforts, and 
rewards). Lacking all the necessary information, 
criminals may resort to “rules of thumb” or heuristics 
when perpetrating offenses, or they may rely on a 
tried and tested general approach that may be called 
into action when unexpected situations arise. When 
this is considered in relation to the quality of 
information used to inform ICA decisions, it could be 
argued that some insiders have access to near-perfect 
information when planning potential offenses.  
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Although the organizational context can, in the above 
light, be seen to benefit offenders, the white-collar 
literature has also noted that the specific roles 
employees undertake in various departments can be a 
delimiting factor with regard to the types and forms 
of ICA abuse they can undertake. For example, 
Piquero and Benson (2004) noted that, unlike street 
offenders’ opportunities, those of white-collar 
criminals are not ubiquitous or so democratically 
distributed. Rather, they argued that access to 
opportunities are shaped by the occupational position 
undertaken by employees and the abilities/skills 
required to discharge the associated roles. In this 
sense, Piquero and Benson concluded that white-
collar offenders have a different “opportunity 
structure” than do street criminals. This reinforces the 
idea that the roles insiders undertake for legitimate 
purposes may limit the range of illegitimate 
opportunities open to them.  
Cornish and Clarke (1987) expanded on the 
discussion of the offender-context dynamic by 
focusing on the offense. More specifically, they 
developed the concept of “choice-structuring” 
properties, which Cornish (1994) says 
constitute the unique blend of features which 
distinguish one criminal activity from 
another in terms of its goals, targets, victims, 
locations, risks, payoffs, and various 
complementary requirements, such as 
motives, expertise, special knowledge 
resources, co-offenders, and so on (p. 168). 
Because each offense has a unique blend of choice-
structuring properties, an offender must meet a series 
of requirements in order to successfully carry out the 
offense. As noted, these could include specialist 
knowledge, appropriate resources, and so on. In the 
organizational context, this could explain the 
relatively limited nature of insider opportunities and 
hence why, as Piquero and Benson (2004) noted, the 
opportunities open to them are “structured” by their 
legitimate roles. For example, an employee in the 
marketing department of an organization may have 
access to customer data, which could be sold to a 
competitor. Thus, the employee’s position and skills 
help to structure the criminal opportunities open to 
him or her. Employees in the finance department are 
unlikely to be able to exploit the very same 
opportunity, given their position and skills. However, 
their job may afford opportunities for embezzlement, 
because they have the abilities and access to exploit 
the online bookkeeping system, which they use in 
their everyday work. 
The above discussion leads to our third research question: 
Future Research Question 3: How are potential 
opportunities for ICA shaped by the roles and 
associated skills of insiders?  
As noted, scant attention has been paid to the issue of 
foresight and planning in the ISec literature, but the 
RCT framework affords a consideration of this 
element of ICA. Interestingly, given the relatively 
unique position of insiders, it may well be that they 
become aware of potential opportunities prior to the 
development of a specific motivation. As Benson and 
Moore (1992, p. 269) noted, 
The bank employee’s ever-present 
opportunity to embezzle may be resisted, for 
example, when all is going well. But in the 
case of a family member’s expensive illness 
or a reversal of financial fortunes, the same 
employee may feel compelled to embezzle. 
This further illustrates the complexity of the offender 
decision-making process, particularly in the 
organizational context. Although mapping out the 
elements of this process for ICA presents a challenge, 
we argue that it is better to have a clear view of 
offender decision-making than a myopic view 
erroneously focused solely on intention.  
4.4 Determining Which Outcomes to 
Measure and Obtaining Black-hat 
Data 
Turning from the three general areas for future 
research we have proposed, we cannot overemphasize 
that in proposing the application of a full RCT 
perspective to DT, we are not advocating the creation 
of large combined models that predict intentions, as 
has been done for compliance intentions (Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010) and noncompliance intentions (Hu et al., 
2011). These early efforts enriched the ISec literature, 
but we do not advocate the use of their approach in 
future research. Instead, we insist that it is time to 
move on to something bolder. That is, a full RCT 
perspective allows for the correct causal ordering of 
factors, which can replace the assumption that all 
factors influence intention. Going forward, ISec 
researchers should examine a causal chain of factors, 
such as readiness, initial involvement, intentions, 
behaviors, and different deterrence stages (e.g., 
absolute versus restrictive deterrence).  
Clearly, this is a tall order that will likely require 
better application of existing methods. This is where 
scenarios-based studies may come up particularly 
wanting. Although scenarios can be useful for 
reducing social desirability bias, they are not 
particularly good for understanding a chain of events 
that unfolds in the real world. The use of intentions to 
study deterrence in response to hypothetical scenarios 
is common not only in ICA studies but also in the 
general criminological research on deterrence; 
however, a recent study by Loughran, Paternoster, & 
Thomas (2014) suggested that a great deal of caution 
should be exercised when drawing conclusions from 
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deterrence-type studies that rely on hypothetical 
scenarios and intentions to offend. This alone needs 
to be further examined in future research. 
A partial solution to the one-time, cross-sectional 
scenarios problem is for ISec researchers to move 
toward longitudinal self-report studies, as is being 
done increasingly in criminological research. This 
approach allows researchers to observe the natural 
unfolding of a causal chain of events that can be 
reasonably deduced, including the introduction of 
controls and treatments. Unfortunately, the key 
problem with this approach is that it could reintroduce 
the one key problem that scenarios resolve: social 
desirability bias. Clearly, the more nefarious the 
behavior, the less likely it is to be confessed, even 
under the veil of anonymity. 
One way this can be addressed in workplace studies is 
through matched studies, similar to that recently 
conducted in a ISec compliance context on extra-role 
behaviors by Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry (2015). In their 
study, the employees’ managers and supervisors (as 
matched to the respondents) reported on the employees’ 
in-role and extra-role security behaviors. In a similar 
manner, ISec researchers could have employees 
complete self-report responses regarding their 
perceptions and demographic factors that relate to DT 
and RCT—and then have managers report on their 
employees’ known ICA behaviors. Of course, such 
responses would likely underreport ICA, because 
managers do not necessarily know about ICA until the 
perpetrator confesses or is caught; thus, any significant 
findings would likely have much larger effects in reality. 
Monitoring employee behavior is already an unwieldy 
task for managers, and ICA can be especially vexing 
to ferret out and resolve. Thus, an additional approach 
could be to employ threat awareness initiatives that 
have been traditionally used to monitor and thwart 
external attacks, and to leverage these internally 
(Cole, 2014; Costa, Albrethsen, Collins, Perl, 
Silowash, & Spooner, 2016; NIST, 2014). 
Increasingly, such initiatives rely on big-data 
monitoring and analysis techniques to look for 
unusual behavioral patterns in order to identify 
fraudulent activities, maleficence, unauthorized entry, 
and so on. More ISec researchers thus need to 
consider big-data analytics as an approach to detecting 
actual, real-time ICA behaviors (cf. Cardenas, Manadhata, 
& Rajan, 2013; cf. Edwards & Keiser, 2015) and should 
perhaps supplement these with self-reports. 
The use of deception to identify employees willing to 
engage in actual ICA may be highly useful for 
avoiding organizational harm and would yield 
excellent data. However, this practice raises serious 
ethical issues. This has long been a common, even 
advocated, practice for thwarting external attacks 
(e.g., use of honeypots and watermarks) (e.g., 
Heckman, Stech, Schmoker, & Thomas, 2015). 
Similar approaches could be used, for example, to 
allow looser access to classified (but fake) documents 
that are watermarked to attract employees prone to 
leaking classified information, engaging in insider 
trading, and committing fraud. Watermarking allows 
organizations to know who leaked the documents. 
The honeypot concept could also be used to lure 
employees to access harmless, fictional data that is 
tracked. Although this sounds like the stuff of spy 
movies, hospitals have begun to use such approaches—
for instance, placing watermarks in sensitive medical 
images—to avoid HIPPA violations due to privacy 
breaches (Li, Narayanan, & Poovendran, 2004).  
In phishing research, deception is used to great effect 
to lure phishing victims in an ecologically valid 
manner, such that they are literally phished by the 
researchers using the same techniques as 
unauthorized phishers, but under agreement with the 
target organization (e.g., Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, 
Dinger, & Marett, 2014). In such studies, ethical 
review boards will typically require that researchers 
debrief or even train those who fall prey to phishing 
studies. This is a net positive, because these phishing 
“victims” learn how to avoid falling prey to real 
phishing. Similar approaches could be used in setting 
up honeypots and watermarks to determine who is 
likely to commit ICA in an organization. The great 
advantage of deception for research purposes is that it 
can be used to truly identify ICA behaviors and the 
individuals prone to it in a controlled and ecologically 
valid environment, which, in contrast to phishing 
studies, it is accompanied by little risk of harm for the 
organization. The key issue here, however, is how to 
deal with employees who become involved in such 
behaviors. Legal and ethical review board 
considerations will likely require such research to 
stop the employees before they commit actual illegal 
acts (e.g., after they attempt to gain unauthorized 
access but before they actually gain it) and then to 
debrief and train them without reprisal. The ISec 
researchers who first do this will certainly discover a 
methodological gold mine. 
Finally, several of these issues could be resolved by 
examining them at the organizational level and with 
secondary data. For example, publicly traded 
organizations could be selected and classified 
according to known aggregated factors associated 
with DT and RCT constructs, using secondary data 
and surveys of organizational members. This 
information could then be linked to data from 
secondary news reports (e.g., Lexus/Nexus) of actual 
ICA reported in the news or ICA that is required to be 
disclosed per the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPPA 
regulations, and so on. These kinds of secondary data 
studies are already used to great effect to investigate 
fraud and compliance issues in accounting; certainly, 
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they could be similarly leveraged in an organizational 
security context, as has been recently done by 
Baskerville, Hee Park, & Kim (2014). Such studies 
simply need to be better positioned to gather DT and 
RCT constructs from either surrogate secondary data 
or key organizational stakeholders. 
5 Contributions  
This study makes two significant contributions to the 
study of deterrence. First, we demonstrate how DT 
can be applied within a rational choice framework 
(e.g., Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Although previous 
research has suggested that DT should be 
incorporated within RCT (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011), 
no study has explained how to achieve this and the 
implications of doing so. Notably, neither deterrence 
theorists in the field of criminology nor those in the 
field of ISec have clearly specified the particular 
decisions that are influenced by the assessment of 
sanctions (Paternoster, 1989b; Piliavin et al., 1986). 
Indeed, the existing ISec deterrence studies have 
generally assumed that the only decision made by the 
offender is with regard to the intention to perform a 
certain behavior. This assumption makes it 
impossible to incorporate DT within an RCT 
framework, because RCT explicitly recognizes that 
the offender makes a number of choices related to a 
series of stages in the criminal decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the choices within each stage 
are affected by different causal factors. 
RCT’s acknowledgement of the complexity of the 
criminal decision-making process affords the 
application of two forms of deterrence, absolute and 
restrictive (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Gibbs, 1975; 
Paternoster, 1989a). We demonstrate how absolute 
and restrictive deterrence can be aligned with what 
are termed the initial involvement and event stages of 
the RCT framework. The initial involvement stage 
encompasses an employee’s decisions regarding 
whether criminal or legitimate means will satisfy their 
needs. If a potential offender decides that criminal 
behavior will address their needs, they will have 
decided to participate in crime and reached a state of 
readiness. It is only later, during the event stage, that 
an offender will commit the criminal act. Thus, the 
RCT framework considers deterrence in the 
traditional manner, noting that an offender can be 
deterred from committing further criminal acts (i.e., 
restrictive deterrence), which impacts the frequency 
of offending. However, it also affords a specific 
consideration that an individual may be deterred 
from ever participating in crime (i.e., absolute 
deterrence). This conceptual distinction provides 
much needed clarity in terms of understanding 
whom can be deterred and when. 
Our second contribution is that advancing the RCT 
framework can open up new research areas that were 
previously obscured by oversimplified 
conceptualizations of offender decision-making. 
Indeed, in Section 4 of our paper, we outline three 
areas for future study, each with a related and 
overarching research question. Thus, that section 
opens with a reiteration of the need to examine DT 
from an RCT perspective. This is followed by a 
discussion of the first area for future research, which 
is accompanied by a specific call to use RCT as a 
basis for researching absolute and restrictive 
deterrence. In addition, and as just noted, it is during 
the initial involvement stage that a potential offender 
will consider whether legitimate or criminal behavior 
will satisfy their needs. Such a decision will be 
influenced by the motivations that underpin these 
needs. In the current ICA deterrence literature, 
“motivations” have been considered solely with 
regard to the criminal act, but this overlooks why an 
individual would initially consider participating in 
ICA. This “why” can, therefore, be considered 
through an examination of these ICA motivations at 
the initial involvement stage. 
In addition, considering the roles undertaken by 
employees can illuminate how their skills and 
abilities can delimit or structure the ICA opportunities 
open to them. Thus, what might constitute an 
opportunity for an organization’s accountant, via the 
online bookkeeping system, would be unlikely to 
represent a similar opportunity for a marketing 
employee in the same organization. The staff member 
of the marketing department would neither have access 
to the online bookkeeping system nor the skills and 
knowledge to process, for example, a fraudulent invoice.  
6 Conclusion  
Although ICA represents a significant threat for 
organizations, and despite numerous calls to examine 
this form of behavior, the academic response thus far 
has been scant. However, the issue of deterrence has 
drawn the attention of security researchers through an 
examination of its influence in an organizational 
context. Although some studies have applied DT to 
ICA, the manner in which this has been done has 
resulted in many missed opportunities: these studies 
have focused mainly on noncriminal security policy 
violations instead of ICA; they have used 
hypothetical scenarios instead of real behaviors; they 
have used cross-sectional studies instead of 
longitudinal and experimental designs; they have 
overlooked the natural extension of RCT to improve 
DT; they have lacked a complete understanding of 
absolute versus restrictive deterrence; and they have 
generally ignored the decision-making process and 
opportunities that motivate the decision to commit ICA.  
Given these exciting opportunities, the purpose of this 
research-perspective article is to advance a deterrence 
research agenda based on the leading criminological 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
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deterrence literature. Drawing on the distinction 
between absolute and restrictive deterrence and 
aligning these forms of deterrence within a rational 
choice framework enables the use of deterrence to 
influence the participation in and frequency of ICA. 
Therefore, our paper proposes three areas for future 
research on the deterrent effects of ICA, each of which is 
anchored in a more general RCT rather than merely in 
an examination of deterrence as an isolated construct.
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Appendix A.  Literature Review of DT in the Workplace 
We conducted a systematic literature review to complete the Table A1 in this appendix and to further establish 
several of the points in our manuscript. Our primary objective was to find publications that dealt with a combination 
of deterrence theory and employee security behaviors in the workplace. This was not a meta-analysis, but instead, a 
comprehensive review. But like meta-analyses, comprehensive reviews are biased when they intentionally omit 
lower-quality publications, because it turns out that top peer-reviewed journals expect significant results, so results 
that are mixed or insignificant are less likely to be published in top journals. This phenomenon distorts scientific 
results, and is a serious widely known problem called the “file drawer” problem (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2011; Rosenthal, 1979). That is, if a study does not turn out as expected, it virtually never gets past the 
conference or dissertation stage, or ends up in a lower-quality journal (Rosenthal, 1979). Thus, proponents of 
systematic review and meta-analysis insist that the literature included be inclusive and not be filtered for perceived 
“lower-quality” publications (Borenstein et al., 2011; Rosenthal, 1979; Wu & Lederer, 2009; Wu & Lu, 2013). For 
this reason, we cannot have a balanced understanding of the DT security literature, without considering the whole of 
the literature; otherwise, it is ironically more positively skewed to more likely positive results in top journals. 
Accordingly, we included dissertations, conferences, and journal articles. Likewise, this is also why we placed no 
restrictions on which field or which journals were used. We wanted all DT-related security papers, not just ones 
published in IS journals or conferences. We likewise placed no restrictions on the date ranges of the articles. 
To find a reasonable population of such articles, we followed an approach of search oversampling, which is 
commonly done with meta-analytic studies. Essentially the idea here is to have two or more researchers searching for 
articles independently (in our case, it was the authors and two PhD students), and combining them into the same 
repository until no new articles could be found. We did so, using the following partially redundant article 
information repositories: 
• Search EBSCO Business Source Complete. 
• Search ABI/INFORM Business 
• Search Web of Science 
• Search Google Scholar 
• Search the AIS library 
When a new article was found that was in our review scope, its bibliography was checked for potentially overlooked 
articles. The article was then entered into Google Scholar to examine all its citing articles, to find other potential 
overlooked articles. 
In terms of the search terms, we were careful to make sure that the full-text of an article had either “deterrence” or 
“deterrence theory” or “general deterrence theory” in it, AND had the word “security” AND had at least one of the 
following terms: (Compliance, Computer abuse, Computer crime, Fear appeals, Information misuse, Information 
security policies/policy, Malicious, Noncompliance, Policy compliance, Protection motivation, Rational choice, 
Security awareness, Security concern, Security countermeasures, Security policy, Threat, Violation). We earlier 
learned that such searches on keywords and abstracts were unreliable, as usually one of the key parts was often 
missing and thus key articles were overlooked. 
Through this process there were a good number of articles that appeared to be promising but were out of scope. This 
usually occurred because the article was a conceptual article or it was an article that used DT for the context of 
encouraging policy compliance. For example, Dhillon (1999) is an early conceptual piece on deterrence of security 
violations; Lee and Lee (2002) was not included, as it is a theoretical essay; Kankanhalli et al. (2003) was not 
included because it is an organization-level study; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis (2005) is a 
conceptual piece on deterrence; Higgins et al. (2005) used DT in an empirical study of deterring study software 
piracy; Guo et al. (2011) addresses nonmalicious security violations; Willison and Warkentin (2013) was a 
conceptual piece about deterrence and more. 
Once we found all of the articles that were in scope, we carefully read them and coded them. We especially wanted 
to document the degree to which they dealt with criminal computer abuse, as some dealt with a mix of illegal 
activities and nonillegal activities. We also examined whether the study was one involving organizational employees 
and DT, and the specifics of the method. Table A1 summarizes our efforts. 
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Table A1. Summary of the Major Literature that has Used DT in a Security Compliance/Noncompliance Context 
Citation 
(Study type) 
Criminal / 
malicious context? 
Participants DV type Other theories / 
constructs 
Method Findings / application to DT 
Barlow et al. 
(2013) (ISI) 
No (IT policy 
violation intention) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Neutralization theory Factorial 
survey 
Focused on “communication of deterrent sanctions” as one 
overall DT-related construct. Showed this construct and some 
neutralization constructs lowered intentions to violate IT policies. 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010) (ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance 
intention) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive) 
RCT and TPB Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Study was not a true DT study, but is often miscited as such. It 
was primarily based on RCT and TPB. However, they showed 
that sanctions had a positive relationship with cost of 
noncompliance, which predicted compliance attitude, and then 
intentions. 
Chen et al. 
(2013) (ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance 
intention) 
Employees Scenarios 
(positive) 
Reward, security 
training, monitoring, 
training, policy 
Factorial 
survey 
In addition to severity and certainty, they added reward. All were 
shown to positively influence compliance intentions. 
Cheng et al. 
(2013) (ISI) 
No (ISP violation 
intention) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Social control (social 
bonds and pressure) 
Factorial 
survey 
Added several subconstructs of social bonds and social pressure 
to certainty and severity. Certainty was insignificant; severity 
was significant. Several of the social control constructs were 
significant. 
Chuma (2012) 
(thesis) 
No (noncompliant, 
nonmalicious 
security behavior) 
Employees at 
one company 
Behaviors 
(negative) 
Self-control theory, 
social bonding 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Used certainty, severity, and celerity. Severity was insignificant 
whereas certainty and celerity were significant. Dealt with 
nonmalicious noncompliance behaviors such as write down 
password, share password, not verifying sending of email, 
opening email attachments without knowing. 
D’Arcy & 
Devaraj (2012) 
(ISI) 
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not 
strong criminal 
intent) 
Employees, 
including 
part-time 
MBA 
students 
Scenarios 
(negative) 
Informal sanctions as 
DT extension 
Factorial 
survey 
Examined formal sanctions (combined severity/certainty) and 
added informal sanctions (social desirability and moral beliefs). 
All three were significant. All participants were given four 
scenarios and all measures were averaged from the four scenarios 
and analyzed together. 
D’Arcy & 
Hovav (2007) 
(ISI) 
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not 
strong criminal 
intent) 
Employees, 
including 
part-time 
MBA 
students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
n/a Factorial 
survey 
Did not directly use DT constructs, but argued that ISPs, SETA 
programs, monitoring, and preventive security software are 
deterrence surrogates that reduce IS misuse intentions. All were 
significant except computer monitoring. 
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Table A1. Summary of the Major Literature that has Used DT in a Security Compliance/Noncompliance Context 
D’Arcy & 
Hovav (2009) 
(ISI) 
Partial 
(unauthorized 
access/modification 
intent) 
Employees, 
including 
part-time 
MBA 
students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
Moral judgment Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Did not directly use DT constructs, but argued “security 
countermeasures” of ISPs, acceptable use guidelines, monitoring 
and SETA programs are deterrence surrogates that reduce IS 
misuse intentions. Moral judgement was the strongest factor 
whereas mixed support was found for the deterrence surrogates 
D’Arcy et al. 
(2009) (ISI) 
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not 
strong criminal 
intent) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Moral commitment Factorial 
survey 
Showed that severity, but not certainty, was associated with 
decreased IS misuse intentions. Also, added moral commitment 
as a negative influencer. Other factors were also examined to 
predict certainty and severity. Four scenarios: (1) email joke, (2) 
use restricted information to ask for a raise, (3) unlicensed 
software, (4) round-up work hours. All participants were given 
four scenarios and all measures were averaged from the four 
scenarios and analyzed together. 
Fan & Zhang 
(2011) 
(conference) 
No (nonstandard 
threats behavior 
DV) 
Employees Nonstandard 
DV 
n/a Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Used security policies, SETA programs, monitoring, and 
preventative software as surrogates of DT’s concept of 
deterrence. They ran all of these against four kinds of 
information threats as DVs, contrary to the general literature, and 
mixed results were obtained. 
Guo & Yuan 
(2012) (ISI) 
No (intentions to 
violate policies) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Personal sanctions Factorial 
survey 
Conceived of sanctions on organizational, workgroup, and 
personal levels. Organizational sanctions were insignificant, 
whereas personal and workgroup sanctions were significant. 
They did not distinguish severity/certainty of sanctions. 
Guo et al. 
(2011) (ISI) 
No (nonmalicious 
security violation 
intentions) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
ISP attitude, relative 
advantage, risk, norms, 
identity match 
Factorial 
survey 
Added several unrelated constructs to sanctions (combined 
certainty/severity). Used this to predict attitudes toward 
nonmalicious security violation intentions. Sanctions was 
insignificant as was attitude toward ISP. Attitudes predicted 
intentions. 
Harrington 
(1996) (ISI) 
Yes (computer 
abuse) 
IS employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
Ethical judgments 
(denial of 
responsibility) 
Factorial 
survey 
This is not directly a DT study. However, they used corporate 
codes of ethics as deterrence surrogates in their study and used 
DT literature to justify this decision. Scenarios involved true 
criminal computer abuse: cracking, sabotage, purposeful virus 
spread, software theft, fraud. Showed corporate codes did not 
reduce intent; however. they did serve to reduce denial of 
responsibility. 
Herath & Rao 
(2009a) (ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance 
intentions) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive) 
Social 
pressure/extrinsic 
motivation; perceived 
effectiveness/intrinsic 
motivation 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Severity was insignificant whereas certainty was significant in 
increasing ISP compliance intention. Social pressure (normative 
beliefs and peer behavior) and perceived effectiveness were also 
significant. 
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Table A1. Summary of the Major Literature that has Used DT in a Security Compliance/Noncompliance Context 
Herath & Rao 
(2009b) (ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance 
intentions) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive) 
Protection motivation 
theory (PMT), theory 
of planned behavior 
(TPB) 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Model mixed DT, PMT, and TPB. Severity decreased intentions 
whereas certainty increased intentions. ISP attitude had no effect; 
whereas organizational commitment, self-efficacy, and norms 
were significant. 
Hovav & 
D’Arcy (2012) 
(ISI) 
Partial (IS misuse 
intentions; not 
strong criminal 
intent) 
Employees, 
including 
part-time 
MBA 
students 
Scenarios 
(negative) 
Moral beliefs Factorial 
survey 
Examined DT in U.S. versus Korea context. All participants were 
given four scenarios and all measures were averaged from the 
four scenarios and analyzed together. Examined severity and 
certainty. Certainty was significant for U.S. sample but severity 
was not; severity was significant for Korean sample but certainty 
was not. 
Hu et al. 
(2011) (ISI) 
Yes (criminal 
computer abuse) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
RCT, self-control, 
shame, moral beliefs 
Factorial 
survey 
Used certainty, severity, and celerity of sanctions. In model these 
three directly predicted informal and formal risks. Separate 
model showing these three against negative intentions showed no 
significance. Only extrinsic and intrinsic benefits were directly 
significant. Three computer abuse scenarios: unauthorized access 
for gain, steal/sell commercial secret, steal/sell product info.  
Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003) (ISI) 
No (looked at IT 
security 
effectiveness) 
IT managers Manager 
assessment 
of security 
effectiveness 
(positive) 
Deterrent efforts; 
preventative efforts 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Examined how deterrent efforts (representing certainty), 
deterrent severity, and preventive efforts lead to IS security 
effectiveness, and the demographics factors that influence the 
underlying predictors. No direct measure of anything criminal or 
of malicious nature. Severity was significant for U.S. participants 
whereas certainty was significant for Korean participants 
Lee et al. 
(2004) (ISI) 
Yes (computer 
abuse) 
Employees Intentions & 
behaviors 
(negative) 
Social control Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Did not use certainty and severity. Instead, used security policy, 
security awareness, and physical security system all as “general 
deterrence theory” surrogates. Examined intention from 
participants and then added reported actual abuse from insiders 
and outside “invaders.” Model deterrence surrogates as 
predictors of “self-defense intention”, which then was significant 
modeled to decrease abuse by “invaders” and abuse by insiders. 
Of the surrogates, only “security system” was significant. 
Li et al. (2010) 
(ISI) 
No (compliance 
intentions with 
Internet use policy) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive) 
RCT Cross-
sectional 
survey 
This was primarily an RCT-based model, but they added 
certainty, severity, and subjective norms (as informal sanctions). 
Certainty was significant whereas severity and norms were 
insignificant. 
Liao et al. 
(2009) (ISI) 
No (intentions to 
avoid Internet 
misuse) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive) 
TPB, ethics Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Only predicted severity and certainty to misuse attitudes (not 
intentions), perceived behavioral control, and subjective norms. 
Neither severity nor certainty significantly predicted attitudes. 
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Table A1. Summary of the Major Literature that has Used DT in a Security Compliance/Noncompliance Context 
Lowry et al. 
(2015) (ISI) 
Partial (computer 
abuse but not all was 
criminal/malicious) 
Employees Behaviors 
(negative) 
Fairness theory Cross-
sectional 
survey 
The primary purpose of the article was testing fairness theory in 
the context of reactive computer abuse at work. However, the 
authors tested certainty, severity, and celerity as 
counterexplanations. They were not significant in this context. 
Pahnila et al. 
(2007a) 
(conference) 
No (ISP 
compliance) 
Employees Intentions 
(positive)  
PMT, habit, norms, 
rewards 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Multiple theories and constructs combined with “sanctions” from 
DT. Did not separate certainty/severity. Sanctions were not 
significant in predicting intentions, but attitudes, norms, and 
habits were. Intentions predicted actual compliance, but did not 
test sanctions against actual compliance. 
Peace et al. 
(2003) (ISI) 
Yes (software 
piracy) 
Employees Attitudes & 
Intentions 
TPB Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Studied employee software piracy in the workplace. Severity and 
certainty decreased attitude. 
Siponen & 
Vance (2010) 
(ISI) 
No (ISP violations 
intentions) 
Employees Scenario 
(negative) 
Neutralization theory; 
shame 
 
Factorial 
survey 
Used extended version of DT that included informal sanctions, 
and added shame. Formal and informal sanctions included 
certainty and severity, but these were analyzed as one construct. 
Only neutralization was significant. 
Siponen et al. 
(2007) (book) 
No (ISP 
compliance) 
Employees Behaviors 
(positive) 
PMT, TRA Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Multiple theories and construct combined with “sanctions” from 
DT. Did not separate certainty/severity. Did not run sanctions 
against intentions, but instead ran them against actual 
compliance, and these were significant. 
Siponen et al. 
(2010) (ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance) 
Employees Intentions & 
behaviors 
(positive) 
PMT, TPB, visibility, 
rewards 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Very general compliance (e.g., “I comply with information 
security policies”). Combined PMT and several other constructs 
with DT. Combined DT severity, certainty, and celerity as one 
construct called “deterrences,” and this was a significant 
predictor of actual compliance. 
Note that Pahnila et al. (2007b) was a conference version of this 
paper with the same data; thus, we only summarize these together 
here. 
Son (2011) 
(ISI) 
No (ISP 
compliance) 
Employees Behavior 
(positive) 
Intrinsic motivation 
(legitimacy, value 
congruence), CSE 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Both certainty and severity were insignificant whereas computer 
self-efficacy, legitimacy, and value congruence were significant. 
Straub (1990) 
(ISI) 
Yes (computer 
abuse) 
IS 
management 
Manager 
report of 
observed 
abuse 
(negative) 
Provide basic rival 
explanations 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
Implementing IS security deterrents (measured as certainty and 
severity) decreased computer abuse. 
Straub (1986) is the dissertation version of this article and has the 
same data; thus we summarize them together here. 
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Table A1. Summary of the Major Literature that has Used DT in a Security Compliance/Noncompliance Context 
Straub & 
Welke (1998) 
(ISI) 
Yes (computer 
abuse) 
IS 
management 
Qualitative 
discussion of 
risk 
assessment 
n/a Qual. Nonempirical qualitative study that used ideas of DT to help 
cope with and plan for systems risk. Not a direct test of DT, but 
suggested communicating sanctions as part of SETA programs. 
Ugrin & 
Pearson (2013) 
(ISI) 
No (cyberloafing) Employees 
and students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
Detection, 
enforcement, 
abusiveness 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
A major measurement issue is that “sanction” was used to 
represent DT and they were given a cue of potential sanction of 
being fired or receiving a reprimand for each kind of 
cyberloafing. Asked about intentions for six different kinds of 
cyberloafing. Another major issue is that half of the respondents 
were students, which makes their responses to company-specific 
measurement items questionable. 
Ugrin et al. 
(2008) (non-
ISI) 
No (cyberslacking) Employees 
and students 
Intentions 
(negative) 
Self-control, prior 
behavior 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
One issue is that they equated “detection systems” to be 
representative of severity/certainty. Another major issue is that 
half of the respondents were students, which makes their 
responses to company-specific measurement items questionable. 
Analysis was also not performed in standard manner. Generally 
concluded detection mechanisms deter cyberslacking. Study may 
be more about monitoring than it is about severity/certainty: in 
their 2013 study Ugrin and Pearson (2013) show detection 
separately as a positive moderator of sanctions. 
Warkentin, 
McBride,  et 
al. (2012) 
(conference) 
No (intentions to 
violate policies) 
Employees Scenarios 
(negative) 
PMT, Big-5 
personality traits 
Factorial 
survey 
Severity was significant but certainty was not; mixed results with 
other constructs. 
Workman & 
Gathegi (2007) 
(ISI) 
No (contravene 
security policies) 
Employees Behaviors 
(negative) 
TPB, self-control, legal 
attitude, norms, ethical 
training 
Field 
exper. 
Punishment is the DT-related construct used in this study, but did 
not follow standard operationalizations and did not measure 
punishment or its manipulation. DV was about reported 
contravention of security measures. Punishment and ethical 
training negatively relate to “threat of software and information 
security contravention.” They had control group, punishments 
warning group, and ethics training group. Data were collected 
before treatments/control and six months later. Found warning 
about punishments and ethics training to be helpful, depending 
on underlying motivations of people.  
Note: ISI = A highly rated, high-impact journal listed on Thomson-Reuter’s ISI Web of Science; non-ISI = nonindexed journal 
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criminological research, Paternoster was widely known for his studies on racial disparities in the application of 
capital punishment in the United States, and research examining the application of rational choice theory. Sadly, he 
passed away after a valiant battle with cancer during the final writing of this manuscript. Importantly, this manuscript 
was inspired by his compelling, interdisciplinary work, and we dedicate this manuscript to his memory. 
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